How Xi Jinping Broke All the CCP’s Rules | Heng He

This episode will premiere on Jan. 31, 2026, at 5 p.m. ET.

[RUSH TRANSCRIPT BELOW] “We are witnessing the turning point of the Chinese Communist Party rule. … The chain of command in the military is totally broken,” says veteran China analyst and Epoch Times columnist Heng He.

On Jan. 24, China’s Ministry of National Defense announced that two top military generals, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli, were under investigation for “serious disciplinary and legal violations.” This comes on the heels of a series of purges of Chinese military leaders.

Of the seven original members of China’s Central Military Commission, five have now effectively been purged or removed. Only two remain. And one of those two is Xi Jinping himself.

In my deep-dive interview with He, he lays out why he’s convinced the latest purges are the signs of something historic happening in China.

“They have open rules, and they have hidden rules. But what Xi Jinping did was against every single rule,” He says.

What’s really going on behind the scenes now? And what does this turmoil mean for the Chinese Communist Party’s plans to invade Taiwan? What are the policy implications for the United States?

Views expressed in this video are opinions of the host and the guest, and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.

RUSH TRANSCRIPT

Jan Jekielek:

Heng He, such a pleasure to have you back on American Thought Leaders.

Heng He:

The pleasure is mine. Thanks for having me.

Mr. Jekielek:

So there is something absolutely astonishing happening among the top leadership of the Chinese Communist Party [CCP] with profound implications for the country, perhaps for the world. What’s going on?

Mr. He:

I think what happened last week, it’s very rare to find such a thing. So I would say we are witnessing the turning point of the Chinese Communist Party’s rule. There are three, you know, at most three events that can be compared in Chinese Communist Party history after they took over China. One is in 1962 when the Great Leap Forward failed and tens of millions of people died. And then there’s the power switch. Liu Shaoqi, the second in command of Mao Zedong, took over the power but kept Mao Zedong as a symbolic figure. That’s in 1962.

The second event that can be compared to is during the Cultural Revolution. Lin Biao, the second in command of Mao Zedong, was purged and escaped to Mongolia, where he died. That was, I would say, the turning point of Mao Zedong’s legacy. From that day, Mao Zedong’s legacy was almost gone. The Chinese people really thought about what the real nature of the Cultural Revolution was, and that led to the end of the Cultural Revolution.

The third one is the end of the Cultural Revolution. They purged the Gang of Four. The Gang of Four consisted of Mao Zedong’s wife and the three others promoted by Mao Zedong during the Cultural Revolution. So it’s kind of like a gang of the Cultural Revolution. They arrested all four of them, which marked the end of the Cultural Revolution.

I think the fourth one is the purge of Zhao Ziyang in 1989, during the Tiananmen suppression massacre; they got rid of the head of the Communist Party, General Secretary Zhao Ziyang. I think this event deserves to be compared with those big events. It’s like once a decade.

Mr. Jekielek:

So what exactly happened? I mean, we’re seeing, you know, basically a profound shift in the power structure. This is something we talked about a while ago, perhaps a year ago, regarding big shifts within the Communist Party, big power changes. But here we see another shift. So just kind of lay out exactly what happened for me shortly, and then we’ll kind of dig into it a little bit.

Mr. He:

Basically, last time we talked about the power switch, it was basically someone in the party, the top leadership, and all the retired old leaders working with the military. They pretty much took over the power from Xi Jinping, especially in the military and some economic fields, but not totally. It’s a little bit similar to in 1962, you know, Liu Shaoqi took some of the power from Mao Zedong.

And this time it was probably the retired, older leaders with this Zhang Youxia, who was purged this time, took over part of the power, not full power. And this time, I think, after some preparation,  Xi Jinping fought back, I think, and purged this head of the military. Basically, it’s like the power switched back. I would say this is what happened.

Mr. Jekielek:

So now, okay, let’s get the dimensions of this exactly. Now you’re talking about the vice chairman, Zhang Youxia. You’re saying he was the head of basically the military. And now this is Xi Jinping purging. This is Xi Jinping reasserting power.

Mr. He:

Yes. And I believe it, because Xi Jinping is not a military person. So the head of the military was this person, you know, purging Zhang Youxia. And I’m pretty sure I can consider what Xi Jinping did a coup.

Mr. Jekielek:

Okay, explain that to me. Because coup is a very strong word, and there have been accusations of coups over the years happening with different leaders. But why does this reach the level of being called a coup?

Mr. He:

We can see from the public information that Xi Jinping purged Zhang Youxia and did not follow the procedure. It’s totally against CCP’s rules and even hidden rules. They have open rules and they have hidden rules. But what Xi Jinping did was against every single rule, even the hidden rule.

For example, when they announced the purge, the statement was from the CCP Central, you know, CCP Central, didn’t say central what? CCP Central, you know, like investigating this person. Actually, two, two generals in the military, the top one and the top two, top one and the second one. So purge the two, I would say the top leaders of the military.

Usually, they will say who purged them, you know, the power, where the power came from. And they didn’t say it’s a CCP Central. Well, CCP Central is a very, you know, confused name. Usually, it would mean CCP Central Committee or CCP Central Committee Political Bureau or the Standing Committee of the Political Bureau. So three levels.

They all can be called the CCP Central, but the CCP Central is very abnormal. You cannot say that. You have to have a meeting, you know, procedure, have a meeting. If you don’t have the meeting, you don’t have the decision, that’s illegal. So if it’s illegal, that’s a coup. And this is one reason.

Another reason is, you know, the chairman or vice chairman of the CCP Central Military Commission, you know, should be decided by the CCP Central Committee. And the Central Committee didn’t have a meeting, so they didn’t authorize the purge. You know, they must authorize the promotion and the purge, but there’s no such procedure. Second, in the Central Military Commission [CMC], they have to have a meeting to decide who is in what position. They also need to make the decision to purge somebody inside the military commission.

The problem is they already purged three of the members of the military commission. So only four are left, and this time four were purged. That means if they have a meeting to vote, then it should be two to two, right? So two agreed to purge another two.  That was impossible. None of the procedures, you know, procedures written in the rules were carried out. That’s why I said this is a coup. It’s very illegal.

Mr. Jekielek:

I mean, this is absolutely fascinating, right? Because this is in every system, right? Like, say, in the mafia, right? There are certain rules that have to be followed, right? When people typically break those rules, they get in huge trouble. Why? Because otherwise, you have utter chaos. You’re saying that these core rules, the core basics of what’s been happening in the Chinese Communist Party, of how it’s worked in the upper echelons, have been completely compromised now. Xi just kind of went in and said, here’s how it’s going to be.

Mr. He:

Yes. You remember several months ago, they confirmed nine top military leaders were purged, right? But now two top leaders were purged. So this will be a big issue. I think the first thing is that the chain of command in the military is totally broken. It’s totally broken. It’s not like partially or half. This has never happened in the history of communist rule, even during the Stalin era in the Soviet Union. Of course, they purged a lot of military personnel and officials.

But I think in terms of the top leaders, five of the top military leaders were only purged; two are left. But now they have seven in the Central Military Commission, and only two are left, five purged. So this is more serious than in the starting time. I would say that was a big influence on the whole Chinese Communist rule because it’s not just in the military. The purges also happened in the civilian government system, even though it’s not so dramatic.

And everybody will think this is not right. Why? Because usually, the rules will tell people who is in charge and what to do. In China, you have to follow the right person. If you follow the wrong person in the government system or in the bureaucracy, then you will be purged, right? But now people don’t know who the right person to follow is. Because even if you follow Xi Jinping, you still could be purged. So the hidden rule is broken.

I think that will be the end of the whole system. Because the system needs to put people together, the officials together. You should be able to make the system work. But now nobody knows whom to trust and who is the one you should follow. That’s the big problem. And also, the command of the military has been broken. That means the military cannot fight.

Another thing is the Chinese military is different from the rest of the world. They belong to the party, not to the people or the state or the government or any state. So it belongs to the party. It’s a party-ruled military. So the military design is totally different. It’s designed to protect the CCP’s rule, protect the regime, not fight overseas wars.

So the military is basically designed that way. They don’t even have soldiers, and the guns have no bullets in them because they are afraid that they will turn the gun to the wrong side, turn back their guns. So that’s the design.

But people are always afraid that Xi Jinping will take over Taiwan. But once they decide to have a foreign war against Taiwan, they have to put the generals in full control. Xi Jinping cannot fight himself, right? He has to give the power, the command to the military leaders. That means the military has the power to turn the gun backwards.

For now, it’s impossible, against him, I mean. But since everybody is afraid of their position and their safety, even in the military, that’s never happened before because even during the Cultural Revolution, Mao Zedong didn’t really purge the high-ranking officials in the military. The military is relatively stable, but now the military is in a mess.

Mr. Jekielek:

I mean, this is, it’s an astonishing development, right? And I mean, as you said, right, we’ve got five out of seven of the, you know, top military leadership gone. And, you know, obviously it had to do with the fact that Xi felt threatened. He was consolidating his power from what I understand you’re saying.

But at the moment, there are all these questions about what the strength of the Chinese military is. They’ve been building a huge navy. They’ve been building in space. They’ve been expanding their nuclear capabilities dramatically, way beyond anything that’s official from what we know. This is a potent military force in the world, right? And you’re saying it’s without leadership right now. I mean, this sounds concerning.

Mr. He:

Maybe it’s good news for the world, not good news for Xi Jinping, because Xi Jinping is different. I think his conflict with the military, part of the reason is Xi Jinping wants to be a great leader, you know, can be the same as Mao Zedong and Deng Xiaoping. As we talked the last time, you know, he wants to be, he said Mao Zedong is the one to make China stand up. And, you know, Deng Xiaoping makes China rich, and he will make China strong. But strong has no standard. You cannot say this is strong. So he has to do something to make his claim convincing. Taiwan is the best target for him.

But the whole military has different ideas. Two major points: one is that the military is totally corrupted. I’m not saying Zhang Youxia is not corrupted; he is corrupted. But the reason to purge him is not corruption. The reason to purge him is that Zhang Youxia helped others to take some of the power from him.

Another reason is that Zhang Youxia has a totally different idea about taking over Taiwan. I think these two military leaders were purged. They were the only ones who had real field battle experience; others didn’t have any. And they are very professional, those two purged, Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli. They are very professional. Even the American military recognized that they are very good professional military personnel, and they are very good at communicating with Americans. Maybe that’s one of the reasons to purge them.

So they have different ideas. They thought this is a bad idea because the Chinese military is not ready to fight the war in the Taiwan Strait. So I think that means Xi Jinping’s ambition is in conflict with the professional opinion about the war. I think that’s another reason Xi Jinping cannot get along with those two purged military personnel.

Mr. Jekielek:

You know, I want to jump into that in a moment, where basically this idea that in a way this could be creating a more dangerous situation because Xi, who doesn’t, I mean, I’ll get you to qualify this for me, but from what I understand, Xi has no military experience and now is kind of, you know, I guess through this coup, as you describe it, is kind of trying to take control of the military. And he may make decisions that his professional leadership would never have made because of the cost, perhaps. Before we jump into that, I just have one quick question. So you don’t think that Zhang Youxia actually did something with nuclear secrets and the Americans?

Mr. He:

No, not at all. The Wall Street Journal published an article, giving some internal sources. But you have to know that in the PLA Daily, it’s the military paper, they accused Zhang Youxia of five crimes. And of the five crimes, the most serious one is the broken system of the Central Military Commission Chairman’s sole responsibility. That means the chairman, that means Xi Jinping. Xi Jinping is in full charge of the military. Nobody else should have the power or share the power.

So that means breaking the rule means challenging Xi Jinping’s authority in the military. That’s a political crime; it’s not corruption. This is a half-official statement. It has nothing to do with the nuclear secret, nothing to do with. corruption. It’s all political. It’s a full power struggle.

In the last two days, there was a lot of Western media asking questions at the military press conference. And the answer is no. They denied any accusations about the nuclear secret. So I think somebody on Xi Jinping’s side tried to make the coup look illegal. So they released it intentionally to Western media.

And I don’t think Western media can create this story. The story is from inside. But the leaking has a purpose. The purpose is to frame Zhang Youxia and make him look like a traitor. That’s why. But officially, they won’t be able to prove that. So they don’t do it officially but do it by leaking the information to Western media.

Mr. Jekielek:

So you think they’re basically just using the Western media to create narratives?

Mr. He:

Yes, but not an official narrative. Because there’s no way Zhang Youxia would leak the nuclear secret to the United States. The reason is he is already in the top position. There’s no way Americans can offer a better position. And for the money side, as long as he is willing to take the money, he must already be rich, and sometimes richer than a small country, very rich. Americans cannot bribe him. You cannot pay more than he already has. If he is not so corrupted, that means he doesn’t really need money, then you cannot buy him. So there’s no reason.

By the way, he is not a nuclear expert; I don’t think he knows a lot about the CCP’s, China’s nuclear weapon secrets. I don’t think so. In his position, he doesn’t need to know the details. If you don’t know the details, then you don’t have the secret.

Mr. Jekielek:

I mean, that’s absolutely fascinating. Let’s just jump back to this idea that Xi Jinping may have consolidated his actual power over the military. He has this interest, you’re saying, in Taiwan as a way to show that he has made China strong. His generals, you’ve been saying, wait a sec, this isn’t going to go well for us, so let’s hold off. Does this mean that we might have created a more dangerous situation because of his ambition?

Mr. He:

It could be, but since the military is not willing to fight, that’s the situation.

Mr. Jekielek:

How do you know that?

Mr. He:

There’s no winning issue for Xi Jinping, but of course, it’s more dangerous. You know, the whole story from the beginning, like in 2023, started with purging the rocket army, right? And the military equipment and development department. That’s Zhang Youxia’s territory. So purging those is because Xi Jinping wants to take over Taiwan and he wants to, the military, you know, he designed in 2015, you know, to switch the military from inside to outside fighting.

But it looks like it failed. Because of the corruption, the military cannot fulfill his needs. That’s why he started to purge Zhang Youxia’s territory. That’s why Zhang Youxia tried to fight back. And last year, all the military top leaders purged were all belonging to the Xi Jinping faction. So there’s another reason we believe that the power switch happened.

And now Xi Jinping took over the power and got rid of only two reasonable military top leaders. Another one left; we said two left in the military central committee. Xi Jinping is the one. Another one was promoted last October, last year in October, was Zhang Shengming.

But Zhang Shengming is a political leader of the military. He doesn’t know anything about the military; he doesn’t know anything about war. So he was a commissar person. People call him a commissar person. And that means now amateurs replaced professionals. So it’s more dangerous. I believe it’s more dangerous.

But also the military power, you know, the power for the war is much, much weaker than before. So they have no way to win a war. The control of the conflict is less possible, you know, with a professional; you know, they can control the conflict. But without the professionals, now it’s amateurs in charge. There will be more chances to have uncontrolled conflict. But not necessarily do they have strong military power to win the war. No, I don’t think so.

Mr. Jekielek:

You’re saying that the military power is dramatically reduced because of the lack of professional leadership. What about overall for Xi? So Xi has consolidated power. He’s had this coup, as you’ve described it. What does this kind of mean for the CCP’s power on the external stage, on the world stage?

Mr. He:

So far, they claim, you know, the military claims that the communication with the foreign military will be continued and won’t stop. That was one way they tried to make things seem like nothing happened or nothing serious happened. But actually, there will be a lot of changes in CCP’s international policies. But I don’t think they will because the CCP doesn’t really have a good international global strategy. Basically, their strategy is against the United States.

Even since 1949, when the CCP took over China, their strategy has been against the United States. Because the CCP has the basic theory of Marxism, communism, and their theory has overtaken the whole world. They have never changed. The reform and openness are just one exception during Deng Xiaoping’s time. And I think Xi Jinping is back to the CCP’s basic ideology, and they won’t change. So I don’t expect to see many changes. That’s my thought.

Mr. Jekielek:

I know that it’s very difficult to predict what will happen, but this is a profound shift. And you say there’s a more chaotic situation. Would it be fair to say sort of an overall reduction in power for the system?

Mr. He:

Actually, we can predict some of the future under CCP’s rule. Because, you know, for the past several years, there has been a saying that the officials in the government, in the party system, in the government system, have a trend to lay down, you know, don’t do anything, because they don’t know what to do that is right, can be promoted, or keep their position or even keep them safe. They don’t know what to do. So doing nothing is the safest choice they have. So there’s a very popular trend that the officials in the government system lay down doing nothing. Now, this extends to the military now.

So it means Xi Jinping has the superpower. All the power came to himself. But the whole bureaucracy becomes less powerful and less efficient. And everybody knows Xi Jinping is the sole dictator, you know, cannot do everything, right? You have to depend on the system. Now the system was destroyed by Xi Jinping, and that will be a big problem. You know, the Soviet Union collapsed; it’s not because they didn’t have a strong military, it’s because the system collapsed.

Now, Xi Jinping faces the same situation. He wants to have full power, but at the same time, he is destroying the system. Of course, I think maybe it’s not a bad thing, because the Chinese Communist Party is the one that creates all the trouble in the world or in China. And Xi Jinping is, in another way, destroying the party, destroying the system.

It’s a little bit like Mao Zedong in the early stage of the Cultural Revolution, you know, destroying the whole system he built. But of course, in several months, you know, in early 1967, Mao Zedong rebuilt the system. That’s his system. But Xi Jinping, I don’t think he has the chance or the ability to rebuild anything he destroyed.

Mr. Jekielek:

Well, so it’s very interesting, the analogy now to the Soviet Union, because there were kind of a few things happening. One was, like you said, the system of power sharing and being able to affect policy, kind of make things happen, was kind of crumbled internally. The other side was the economic difficulty. I mean, this is part of the American plan, which was to outspend and get them to basically economically hurt themselves. The CCP is indeed in a very difficult economic situation right now, especially with these tariff regimes that are coming from the US. Can I get you to comment on that a little bit?

Mr. He:

I think a basic problem is inside China. Because even if there’s no help from the United States, if they have a policy, they have the biggest market in the world, right? So when the United States does something like tariffs, it shouldn’t be damaging. It totally destroys China’s economy. The problem is that when the Chinese Communist Party, during Deng Xiaoping’s time, started the free market or some reform, it was crippled reform. It only had economic reform without political system reform.

So you cannot like everything being listened to. You have to follow the party. You have to listen to the party. You have to have a socialist plan for the economy, and at the same time, you have a full free market. That’s impossible. So that’s why the conflict is already there.

But, you know, with Western investment, lots of money poured in; that problem is not so obvious. It was covered by Western investment, but the problem is still there. After years of accumulation, the problem has become worse and worse. Of course, the CCP is afraid of economic freedom. It will have those who get rich from the free market demanding more political power and a share of political power.

So that’s why Xi Jinping is the resolution. When Xi Jinping took over power, he tried to promote the state economy, plan the economy, and suppress the private sector of the economy. And that’s what Xi Jinping, you know, this is the Communist Party’s reaction to the free market. I think the problem is there. Deng Xiaoping knew that, but he didn’t want to destroy the Communist Party. So that’s why he said we should leave the problem to the next generation. So now it’s the next generation’s problem. That’s the current generation.

Mr. Jekielek:

Well, so what would be your recommendations in terms of how, for example, a U.S. administration might kind of approach this, I guess, somewhat new reality? Let me summarize what I’m seeing, right? You’re saying Xi has once again consolidated power among himself, but his bureaucracy is not as eager to follow anymore because he’s torn apart some of the fabric of the system that kept everything functioning well. At the same time, he has these Taiwan ambitions.

Of course, the U.S. has reiterated its support to protect Taiwan. It has its own challenges. But there is this aspect of instability and ambition, perhaps beyond the ability of the military to affect. Okay. And here we are, we have American and other Western leaders wondering, okay, well, how do we deal with this? What do you say to them?

Mr. He:

I would say the current American policy towards China is, I think, on the correct track. Because no matter what you say, the important thing is what you do. I think it’s on the correct track. So I don’t have many suggestions, but I think the most important thing is to realize that the Communist Party won’t change. This is a major point. You cannot expect the Communist Party, the CCP, or Xi Jinping to behave like a normal leader or a normal regime. Even a regime is not normal. It’s not a normal government. So you cannot take it as a normal opponent or another party of the negotiation or anything.

I think it is important to realize that the CCP cannot cooperate with the United States. They use international organizations like the United Nations or something like that. I think now the current US government realizes that. That’s why they quit some international organizations because those international organizations are not fully controlled by the CCP. So I think just don’t expect them to be normal. That’s the most important.

Once you know they are the troublemakers of the world, you see all the terrorists, all the troublemaking countries, always the CCP, the Chinese Communist Party, is behind. So I think that once you recognize that, I think the politicians know what to do. So I don’t have any suggestions. It’s just that you know exactly who you are dealing with.

Mr. Jekielek:

So something that I’ve written about in my upcoming book, Killed to Order, about the forced organ harvesting industry in China and how that system works is something that’s not necessarily very obvious to people in the West. In the communist system, the supremacy of the communist party is really the absolute top priority of the system, even beyond the basics of human life and dignity and things of this nature. We kind of assume that it’s a normal system, but it’s not.

Mr. He:

Right. The Chinese Communist Party, when it was established, was a branch of the international communist movement until the 1930s or 1940s, when Stalin dissolved this organization. They are still part of the movement of the international communist movement. And they never changed their course. Since communism is not a fit with human nature, we all know that all the communist experiments in every country failed, except in China. But in China, economic development is against all the odds, right? Because they gave up a little bit of communist ideology and gave some space to the free market. That’s why they look successful. But it’s not a communist movement that’s successful; it’s the free market.

So the CCP never gave up their power. It’s always in society, it’s the number one power and never gives up. Now it’s more concentrated. Even though Xi Jinping destroyed the system and broke the system, he is still acting in the name of the Communist Party to protect Xi. So I think that’s exactly what happened in China.

So you expect every time when history is at a turning point, it always turns to the worst. There’s nothing that turns out for the better. It always turns to the worst, except for Deng Xiaoping’s reform. But Deng Xiaoping’s reform was when the whole system, the whole country was at its lowest point, and any direction would be up. So that’s the only exception. And now we can see things turning worse and worse.

So all because the CCP’s ideology is against human nature, it is against any international rules, and against any normal country, normal rule. So I think that means in China, there’s no other power so far that can be considered as the balance. Even the purged military leaders are not a balance of the two sides. It’s like one side is more extreme. That’s the party nature. I think you are absolutely right.

Mr. Jekielek:

Yes, I mean, it’s this zero-sum thinking. It’s always sort of a battle to the death, right? Like, who comes out on top. Heng He, this has been an absolutely fascinating conversation. I mean, we’re living in profound times, and I myself have no idea how it’s all going to play out exactly. Do you have a final thought as we finish today?

Mr. He:

When Lin Biao was purged by Mao Zedong, it actually hit Mao Zedong so hard that his health became a big problem. And four years later, Mao Zedong died, and the revolution ended. I think this is not the success of Xi Jinping. When he purged the most important people, considered as his partners, of course, he didn’t consider them his partners. But the outside world was surprised to see that he purged Zhang Youxia and Liu Zhenli.

And this is not a success for Xi Jinping. Not at all. It’s a failure. Because if you cannot purge everybody you promoted, that means it’s your failure. And I think he realized that, just like Mao Zedong realized purging Lin Biao was a mistake, or was his own failure. And Xi Jinping also recognized that. It should be.

I think we are witnessing a turning point in history, maybe not immediately, but, you know, consider in a couple of years, probably. So I think that somebody in America mentioned 10 years ago that we should prepare for China without communist rule. So I think this is the best way for our preparation to be ready for the big change in China.

Mr. Jekielek:

Well, Heng He, it’s such a pleasure to have had you on.

Mr. He:

Thank you for having me.

This interview has been partially edited for clarity and brevity.