Is China Eyeing a Return of Territory Lost to Russia in the 1800s?

By John Mills
John Mills
John Mills
Col. (Ret.) John Mills is a national security professional with service in five eras: Cold War, Peace Dividend, War on Terror, World in Chaos, and now, Great Power Competition. He is the former director of cybersecurity policy, strategy, and international affairs at the Department of Defense. Mills is a senior fellow at the Center for Security Policy. He is the author of “The Nation Will Follow” and “War Against the Deep State.” ColonelRETJohn2 on “X”, ColonelRETJohn on Substack, GETTR, and Truth Social
July 16, 2025Updated: July 23, 2025

Commentary

In an interview on “The View With Catherine Chang” on Sept. 1, 2024, President William Lai of Taiwan said the Chinese communist regime’s aim of annexing Taiwan was not driven by concerns for “territorial integrity.” Lai assessed that the behavior of the regime was more about militarist expansionism.

A key part of recent history was raised by Lai when he questioned the Chinese regime’s motives: “If it is really about territorial integrity, why don’t they [China] take back the land that was signed away and occupied by Russia in the Treaty of Aigun?” Lai posited in reference to the 1858 treaty signed by the Qing Dynasty that ceded around 232,000 square miles of land in Manchuria to the Russian Empire. This area is equivalent to almost 17 times the size of Taiwan’s land mass, which is close to 14,000 square miles.

In the interview, Lai said the regime’s motive for annexing Taiwan is part of its goal to “transform the rules-based global order” and “achieve hegemony in the western Pacific region and internationally.” A Russian intelligence document shows that Russia, while receiving massive war material aid from China, looks at China as an “enemy.”

The FSB, Russia’s main intelligence service, communicated in the document, “They fear that Chinese academics are laying the groundwork to make claims on Russian territory,” the Daily Mirror reported.

The Russian document describes a “tense and dynamically developing” intelligence battle in the shadows between the two outwardly friendly nations.

Relevance to the Current Ukraine Conflict

The ruling Chinese Communist Party (CCP) routinely refers to its “Century of Humiliation” from approximately 1839 to 1949. This is a stirring rallying cry used to foster nationalism in China. The century started with the Opium Wars waged by colonial nations on China. Russia played its role by seizing large sections of China through warfare and forced land concessions. Professor Alexander Motyl made this observation in an article about the Chinese losses in the 1800s:

“Russia’s land grab took place at the same time that a score of Western imperialist powers were meddling in Chinese affairs and transforming China into a vassal state of the West. Too weak to resist, the Qing dynasty surrendered much of its sovereignty and territory to foreigners—a state of affairs that Mao Zedong only succeeded in reversing many decades later.

“In demanding that Russia return its illegally acquired territories to China, Beijing wouldn’t just be reversing the humiliation it suffered at the hands of 19th-century imperialists. No less important, Beijing would be acting in accordance with the Putin regime’s own historical claims. If Moscow can insist that Ukraine, Belarus and other territories are historically Russian, then Beijing can insist that large swathes of the Russian Federation’s Far East are historically Chinese.”

Besides arms shipments to sustain Russia, China secures most of its energy through illegal purchases of sanctioned Russian gas and oil. By retaking resource-rich Chinese land under Russian control, China would be able to cut out the middleman and have direct access to its own energy.

For China, Is Taking Taiwan or the Russian Far East Easier?

In an article titled “China Will Invade Siberia, Not Taiwan,” a number of logical questions were raised about which option made more planning sense for China. Although China has shown a greatly increased naval strength with multiple demonstrations and rehearsals of an ability to blockade and invade Taiwan, the reality is that China has no experience in conducting a complex, forced-entry, amphibious landing. German forces prepared, marshaled resources, and conducted a massive air campaign against England in 1940 and 1941, but in the end, the German Army gave up without attempting to cross the 25-mile-wide English Channel.

With Taiwan, the ocean gap is a minimum of 100 miles wide with a long typhoon season from roughly May to November each year. Taiwan is increasing its military capabilities and capacities with the arrival of Harpoon anti-ship missiles, M-1 Tanks, and long range HIMAR rockets that can reach Chinese airfields and ports, including assembly areas for an amphibious task force. If any Chinese landing force began to assemble, there would be several weeks of obvious preparation in Chinese ports, a vulnerable period of logistics concentration.

The Center for Strategic and International Studies conducted a wargame in 2023 with the summarized outcome that although the United States and Taiwan would incur heavy losses, China would be defeated in an attempt to take Taiwan. That’s all the more reason for Chinese military planners to gaze upon the lightly guarded, mineral-rich, former Chinese territory held by Russia as the intuitive option with the best return on investment for a military foray.

Chinese Leadership Instability a Factor

In an interview last month in The Epoch Times, Wu Zuolai, a U.S.-based scholar and political commentator, gave insight into the current dynamic of Chinese leadership.

The article reads, “According to Wu, Xi’s core leadership position has been notably weakened since the CCP’s Third Plenum meeting in July 2024, with a new internal counterweight emerging—led by reformist and moderate factions.”

Wu said, “There appears to be a temporary central group that has effectively sidelined Xi’s core authority.”

Noted China expert Gordon Chang had this to say about the instability of the Chinese regime: “A regime in turmoil (China) is probably not capable of the planning and unity necessary to start large-scale military operations, such as an invasion of the main island of Taiwan. Yet it is more likely to end up in a conflict than a stable one.”

The leadership vacuum within China may mean it’s time for innovative measures by the Trump administration. Wu proffered that now may be the moment for the administration, currently engaged in trade talks with China, to take bold action, such as advancing membership in the United Nations for Taiwan.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.