The Fragile Ceasefires: Managing Expectations in the Middle East

Commentary

A few weeks ago, Israelis were huddled in safe rooms or bomb shelters several times a day. Now, Israelis are back to normal. Schools have reopened, and people are attending concerts again. On the surface, life has returned to something resembling normal. But everyone in Israel knows the truth: Things can flip in a single day—especially in the north.

There are currently two short-term, ever-extending ceasefires in place—one between the United States, Israel, and Iran; the other between Israel, Lebanon, and Hezbollah. Neither is peace, nor even a long-term armistice. They are tactical pauses.

The Iranian Regime Is Not a Monolith

From the outside, the Iranian regime tries to project unity. In reality, it is fractured, as U.S. President Donald Trump pointed out in a recent Truth Social post. Different factions—some more pragmatic, others hardline—compete for influence. None can afford to look weak or divided, so they maintain the facade even as they work at cross purposes.

This dynamic explains much of the confusing signaling we’ve seen. One group appears open to a deal. Another group—often the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps commanders—immediately looks for ways to sabotage it. The latest excuse for threatening to close the Strait of Hormuz again was a statement from Trump that the strait (and global shipping) would remain open to everyone except Iranian vessels until a comprehensive deal is reached. That was true. Yet it was seized upon as a pretext.

Trump’s habit of announcing updates publicly adds another layer. In traditional diplomacy, you keep negotiations quiet until the ink is dry. Here, the opposite happens. Some analysts call this reckless. Others believe it is deliberate—it forces Iranian leaders who were not in the room to learn the details from Trump rather than their own colleagues, sowing confusion and exposing divisions. Whatever the intent, the effect is the same—the regime looks less coherent than it wants to appear.

What the US Actually Cares About

Strip away the noise, and America’s core interests are clear and narrow: preventing Iran from acquiring nuclear weapons or significant nuclear material, and ensuring the Strait of Hormuz is not controlled by the Iranian regime. No American administration can declare victory while it remains threatened.

Every serious war game of the past 30 years anticipated Iran trying to close the strait. The fact that the initial phase of the conflict focused on leadership targets, missile production, and nuclear sites—while leaving the strait issue for later—seems, therefore, a conscious strategic choice. It is worth mentioning that Trump keeps reminding everyone that the threat to strike Iranian civilian infrastructure remains on the table.

The Black Knight Problem

This brings us to the greater, structural difficulty. Authoritarian regimes such as Iran’s do not operate with normal cost-benefit calculations. They are willing to let their own populations suffer enormous losses that most leaders would never accept.

I often think of the old “Monty Python and the Holy Grail” scene—the Black Knight who loses one arm, then the other, then both legs, still insists, “None shall pass!” even as only a bleeding torso remains on the ground. These regimes behave similarly. They absorb staggering damage and keep fighting because their leaders’ personal survival and ideological commitment matter more than their people’s welfare.

This is why decisive victories over such actors are rare. You can degrade their capabilities—and Iran’s military capacity has indeed been significantly reduced—but getting them to genuinely surrender or change course is extraordinarily difficult.

History shows a pattern: Regimes such as these usually fall when their own people turn against them, as happened in Eastern Europe in the late 1980s. Outside powers can create conditions, apply pressure, expose the regime’s atrocities, weaken the regime’s tools of repression, and support internal opposition.

There is an old Chinese idiom: “When the melon is ripe, it falls.” The question no one can answer with confidence is when—or whether—that moment has arrived for Iran.

Lebanon: A Historic but Fragile Opening

The situation with Lebanon and Hezbollah offers a smaller-scale version of the same challenge.

The wars of 2023–2024 and the current round have shifted Lebanese public opinion. Many Lebanese people—especially those who are displaced—are tired of paying the price for Iran’s regional ambitions. For the first time in decades, direct talks between the Lebanese government and Israel, at the envoys/ambassadorial level, have begun in Washington. Hezbollah is not at the table, which is intentional.

Whether this leads anywhere seems to depend on two things: whether a deal acceptable to the Lebanese (and Israeli) people can be reached, and whether the Lebanese state—with American help pressuring Iran—can actually enforce it on Hezbollah.

The Mood in Israel

Israelis broadly supported the campaign against Iran and Hezbollah. They understand the threats. But support is not unconditional—it is outcome-based.

After the Oct. 7, 2023, terrorist attack, after two years of displacement in the north, after months of bombardment, many hoped this time would be different. They wanted, and were basically promised by the government, that this time the nuclear threat would be neutralized and that Hezbollah would be dismantled as a serious military force.

Instead, currently, it seems like we have “another” ceasefire. Hezbollah remains intact as an organization. The nuclear program has been set back but not fully eliminated. The result is a mixed national mood: relief that daily life has somewhat returned, but also disappointment and unease.

Managing Expectations

We should, thus, be careful with grand narratives. The Iranian military has been degraded, and Hezbollah has been weakened. Lebanese politics may be shifting. These are real gains. But this is not yet the total collapse of the Axis of Resistance.

The coming weeks and months will test whether these ceasefires become foundations for something more durable or merely interludes before the next round. External pressure matters, and American strategy matters. But in the end, the trajectory of Iran, Lebanon, Israel, and the region may ultimately be decided by the peoples who live there when—and if—“the melon ripens.”

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.