Do Nuclear Numbers Matter

Commentary

Last year, the Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) concluded that both Russia and China are increasingly dependent on nuclear weapons to achieve their national interests. Combined, they are projected to exceed the U.S. strategic nuclear force in numbers, creating a multiple challenger problem for the United States and raising the possibility of a dangerous collaboration between adversaries.

In short, the nuclear landscape does not look good. For the 400 land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) that DIA forecasts for Russia, 50 are Sarmats, each capable of carrying 20 high-yield warheads (WHs) (500 kilotons to 1 megaton each), for a total of 1,000 WHs. The remaining land-based 350 ICBMs will be the Yars, carrying four (tested with six) medium-yield WHs (300 kilotons to 500 kilotons) for a total of 1,400 WHs, giving a grand total of 2,400 land-based ICBM WHs. The Bulava submarine-based sea-launched ballistic missile (SLBM) carries six WHs each, or 1,152 WHs, for a total of 3,552 ICBM/SLBM warheads. Russian strategic bombers can carry another approximately 1,000 WHs on various air-launch missiles. This implies a total Russian long-range strategic force of up to 4,552 WHs, exceeding the 2010 New START treaty limitations by 300 percent.

For China, the newly projected 700 ICBM figure for 2035 was a shock, given DIA’s historical underestimation of the growth in Chinese nuclear forces. Hopefully, this means an end to the agency’s falling victim to China’s ongoing strategic deception. China is currently producing 50 to 75 ICBMs per year. China has 400 ICBMs, so another 300 ICBMs by 2035, at 30 ICBMs/year, is feasible.  In terms of warheads, the Chinese DF-31A can carry three reentry vehicles (RVs) and the DF-41 up to 10 WHs.  Simple calculations indicate that China has the potential to deploy 2,100 to 7,000 ICBM warheads. Regarding Chinese SLBMs, the DIA forecast is for 132 SLBMs—72 JL-3 SLBMs, each with three WHs, and 60 new SLBMs for the three new Type 096 SSBNs. Assuming that the JL-3 carries three WHs, that gives China 216 SLBM warheads. Assuming that the new SLBM carries at least six WHs, that gives China another 360 WHs, bringing the grand total to 576 SLBM WHs, for a range of 2,616 to 7,616 nuclear warheads on 832 SLBMs and ICBMs.

The DIA also predicts that China will deploy 60 fractional-orbit bombardment systems by 2035, a force that grants China a new, more dangerous, and heightened capability. These systems are likely to attack the U.S. early warning, C3, and leadership nodes, whose survivability is required to execute any U.S. retaliatory response.  Also of great concern are the additional 4,000 Chinese hypersonic speed weapons, which can largely evade current defenses and attack from any direction or altitude. It is possible that some of these could be tipped with a nuclear warhead, especially given that China has the materials and manufacturing processes to produce large numbers of M10-20 hypersonic vehicles and does so at far lower cost than the United States’.

North Korea, with some 50 DIA-predicted ICBMs, exacerbates the multiple challenger problem and increases the possible collaboration among Russia, China, and North Korea during a crisis or conflict.

Now let’s look at the United States. The strategic modernization program of record consists of 400 ICBM Sentinel missiles to be deployed in silos through an estimated time frame out to or through 2045, with 400 but possibly 800–1200 warheads. Add to that 12 Columbia-class submarines, each with 16 missiles, and each missile with a maximum of eight warheads, or 1,536 warheads. That gives the United States a grand total of 2,736 total fast-flying warheads if all systems are loaded at their maximum. The United States’ strategic nuclear bomber force of 60 B-52 and B-21 bombers, each with between eight and 12 cruise missiles or gravity bombs, are in the mix and together could add upward of 720 warheads for a hypothetical total of 3,456 strategic long-range warheads—although this may exceed the number of warheads available in our entire available stockpile and the U.S. Air Force’s planned cruise missile acquisition.

Deploying such an expanded or uploaded warhead force would require at least an additional four years, according to nuclear Triad experts. When compared with a potential and projected Russian and Chinese deployed force of more than 11,000 long-range strategic warheads, the United States could be left with at least a three-to-one numerical disadvantage. Of critical importance is to note that the United States’ total deployed force described here is the maximum number the United States can build, as the Sentinel and D-5 missiles would be “maxed out” under the assumed numbers used in this hypothetical force.

Although the United States could add additional strategic bombers to its planned nuclear force, those bombers would probably be necessary for other conventional purposes, as the United States is the only country in the free world with such capability, and current planning is for 100 new B-21 strategic bombers, although there is growing support for upward of 150 such aircraft. If additional ICBMs, submarines, or bombers are to be produced, current U.S. acquisition schedules would probably add such platforms but at the end of the current build schedule or generally after 2040. The United States does have 50 additional ICBM silos (now empty) that could bolster its arsenal. Even so, this projected new window of vulnerability may not close for decades.

One could argue that relative levels of nuclear warheads don’t have a strategic impact. Such an assumption may apply to possible U.S. strategic assumptions, but not necessarily for our adversaries. Arms control deals from SALT in 1972 to New Start in 2010 began with the proposition that parties to these treaties would be operating under the same rules and warhead limits. That is the underlying basis for sound inspections and verifications, and for President Ronald Reagan’s key requirement, “trust but verify.” If warhead levels don’t matter, why require verifiable limits in arms control deals? Why worry if no arms deals are in place?

History tells us that nuclear superiority may have significant value. President John F. Kennedy believed that superiority enabled the United States to stare down the Soviets during the Cuban missile crisis, declaring that the newly deployed Minuteman ICBM force was his “ace in the hole.” It was not dissimilar to his previous belief that the newly deployed Polaris submarine force enabled the United States not to yield to Soviet blackmail over Berlin in 1961.

Having such superior military capability doesn’t eliminate the need for sound diplomacy and strategy in the nuclear age. The United States must be mindful of Henry Kissinger’s explanation that while military force without a sound diplomatic framework is but bluster, diplomacy without the threat of force is without effect.

If the 2023 Strategic Posture Commission is correct that Russia and China are in the nuclear blackmail and coercion business, then the United States cannot assume that Russia and China have the same strategic assumptions or altruistic goals regarding nuclear weapons numbers and arms control as the United States.

While the United States and Russia curbed nuclear warheads by some cuts of 4,500 each under the Moscow and New START agreements (down from 10,000 actual allowed warheads under START I), the decline under both deals was down to the neighborhood of as low as 1,700 to 1,800 deployed strategic warheads. This may indicate that Russia wanted to limit U.S.-deployed nuclear forces to fewer than 2,000 warheads for about 24 years (2002–2026), while Russian nuclear modernization was eventually completed, and the post-Cold War economic decline in Russia could be overcome.

Superior nuclear weapons numbers for China and Russia could translate into tangible strategic leverage and altered international behavior. Meanwhile, recent proposals from nuclear abolition advocates urge the United States to unilaterally abandon its long-standing deterrence strategy, including extended deterrence, and leave the United States with markedly lower strategic nuclear forces than our adversaries. Such a move could signal a weakened U.S. commitment to its NATO and Indo-Pacific allies, undermining confidence in existing deterrence arrangements and potentially compelling allies to seriously consider developing their own nuclear capabilities.

This is highly ironic, as this very outcome was what many critics of the Trump administration assumed would happen when the administration pushed for more defense spending for non-U.S. NATO nations. A stronger NATO, including the United States as a NATO anchor, is better for everyone’s security, especially a conventional buildup that encompasses all NATO members rather than primarily centering most defense spending in the United States.

There is an adage that says the enemy always gets a vote. While the United States may wish for our adversaries to see nuclear forces as a deterrent against the use of force, the reality is starkly different. The enemy has voted. Escalate to win it is. For our enemies, nuclear force is an adjunct of military blackmail and aggression as well as a handmaiden to the unrestricted warfare the United States now faces.

Because nuclear weapons underpin the United States’ overall deterrent strength and provide the umbrella under which U.S. military and diplomatic power operates, it is urgent that the United States complete its planned nuclear deterrent modernization programs, which now go beyond the previous program of record and add important theater/tactical nuclear capability. These forces now and will serve as a critical firewall against the use of force directed at this nation. There is no substitute for this capability, regardless of how strongly abolition advocates may wish otherwise.

From RealClearWire

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.