Promise vs. Reality: Has BC’s UNDRIP Experiment Delivered?

Commentary

After nearly seven years, it is time to compare the promise of UNDRIP to its track record.

Back in 2019, the government in British Columbia passed the Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples Act (DRIPA), hailing it as a historic and transformational move to improve relations with indigenous communities by harmonizing provincial law with the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP).

By 2026, it’s reasonable to ask what DRIPA has actually achieved. The government set five objectives: advance reconciliation, improve relationships and trust with indigenous communities through cooperation and shared decision-making, make provincial laws and policies consistent with indigenous rights as reflected in UNDRIP, reduce conflict and litigation over land and resource decisions, and improve social and economic outcomes for indigenous peoples by embedding respect for rights into government decision-making.

Each goal merits scrutiny.

First, reconciliation. According to a 2026 Angus Reid survey, 53 percent of British Columbians say DRIPA “goes too far in limiting provincial authority over land and resources.” At the same time, more than 100 First Nations and organizations urged Premier Eby to uphold DRIPA and warned that weakening it would reverse reconciliation gains. Confusion and division are not progress. Moreover, as recently reported by the Aristotle Foundation, Canadians have paid $27.2 billion to B.C. First Nations—including non-treaty peoples—in the last 23 years. Does that not count towards reconciliation?

Second, relationships and trust via shared decision-making. The provincial government has negotiated multiple consent and shared-decision agreements under DRIPA, including with the Tahltan and Treaty 8/Blueberry River First Nations, and used consent-based arrangements for projects such as Eskay Creek and Red Chris. But these agreements raise practical questions about scale and consistency. Critics see a de facto veto—or a much higher approval threshold—and worry about uneven application across regions. Industry observers question transparency, timelines, and whether the model can expand without slowing permitting.

Third, aligning provincial law with UNDRIP. This objective has generated the most legal uncertainty. A B.C. court initially ruled that DRIPA did affect B.C. law, but two years later, on Dec. 5, 2025, the B.C. Court of Appeal in Gitxaala v. British Columbia (Chief Gold Commissioner) concluded that B.C.’s mineral claim regime is inconsistent with UNDRIP.

The mining sector reacted sharply. According to the Mining Association of B.C., the decision would “result in more litigation and unprecedented uncertainty” and harm investment. And the Association for Mineral Exploration urged an appeal and amendments to DRIPA and the Interpretation Act to make the regime workable. The Council of Forest Industries also expressed concern over its impacts on forest operations, and the Business Council of B.C. reported high member concern in a May 2026 survey about DRIPA’s application and investment risk.

Fourth, reducing conflict and litigation. DRIPA has not reduced litigation, which remains high and has expanded into new areas as courts clarify its effects. The aforementioned 2025 mineral claims ruling intensified controversy and widened tensions between the government, First Nations, and the public. Premier Eby criticized the ruling, said he would appeal, and publicly considered amending the law. But after pressure from First Nations leaders he committed not to amend or repeal DRIPA, even as public opposition increased.

Fifth, improving socio-economic outcomes for First Nations. Reforms take time but uncertainty carries costs. DRIPA-related uncertainty—especially after the 2025 mineral claims decision—has weakened investment confidence among major businesses, which can reduce job creation and revenue opportunities for First Nations.

So, what should the B.C. government do now?

While the government largely helped create this mess, it could learn from other jurisdictions on how to fix it. In the United States, Indian tribes exercise substantial economic sovereignty without DRIPA-style law. They operate courts, set business rules, levy taxes, own enterprises, and enter binding compacts with states. Although constitutional relationships differ in the United States and Canada, the practical point stands: UNDRIP language is not the same as institutional authority.

Research supports this. The Harvard Kennedy School’s Project on American Indian Economic Development found that when indigenous governments control institutions and decisions, incomes rise, jobs grow, and social indicators improve. Those gains usually follow concrete reforms—clear jurisdiction, secure land and resource rights, and dependable revenue powers—not merely adopting UNDRIP wording.

To sum, the DRIPA experiment has not yet delivered its promised results. It created new processes and some consent-based agreements, but also produced legal uncertainty, public division, and hurt investment confidence—outcomes that can hinder reconciliation and socioeconomic progress. If the government wants reconciliation, it should pivot from reliance on UNDRIP toward practical reforms: clarify legal and regulatory regimes, establish secure land and resource rights, and provide dependable fiscal tools so First Nations can share directly in B.C.’s prosperity.

Joseph Quesnel is a senior fellow with the Aristotle Foundation for Public Policy.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.