The Department of War: Why Strength and Strategy Must Go Hand-in-Hand

Commentary

America once had a Department of War. From 1789 to 1949, under this name, America won its independence, preserved the Union, and emerged victorious from two world wars that defined the modern international order. Its existence made clear that the nation did not shy away from the hard truth that peace often depends on the credible ability and readiness to wage—and win—war. Reconsidering that legacy, along with the posture and policies it represents, could reinvigorate the U.S. approach to deterrence at a time when great power competition is intensifying.

Recent events underscore the enduring relevance of this mindset. The United States’ strikes on Iran earlier this year demonstrated both capability and will. Far from escalating conflict, such decisive action reinforced deterrence and showed adversaries that aggression carries consequences. History repeatedly shows that credible, immediate responses to provocations are the best ways to keep the peace. Deterrence is not simply about having forces—it is about demonstrating that we will use them if required.

The change of the Department of Defense back to the Department of War, if paired with real investments in capability, modernization, and readiness, will signal that America is serious about defending its interests and those of its allies. It would remind allies and adversaries alike that the United States does not confuse restraint with weakness, nor dialogue with deference.

For all our desire to avoid conflict with China, we must remember that peace is not a unilateral choice. Beijing must want it, too. Its actions suggest otherwise. The recent meetings among Xi Jinping, Vladimir Putin, and Kim Jong-un, coupled with Beijing’s highly publicized military parade, bellicose training activities, and aim to coordinate economically and technologically against the United States, underscore a shared vision by China and its partners of countering U.S. influence and rewriting international rules. Pretending that Beijing can be dissuaded solely by our rhetoric is a recipe for strategic surprise. Instead, we should implement a whole-of-government approach focused on executing a coherent, winning strategy.

During World War II, America understood that information warfare was also vital in competition and conflict, creating agencies such as the U.S. Office of War Information. These capabilities were dismantled upon victory. America had also created powerful agencies, such as the War Industries Board and the War Production Board, that successfully coordinated national industrial capacity, but then dissolved these capabilities. Meanwhile, China has built the world’s most sophisticated propaganda and information warfare apparatus—deploying armies of social media influencers, controlling global narratives through state media, and conducting massive disinformation campaigns aimed at the United States and its allies and partners. China also maintains permanent state-directed economic coordination across its entire industrial base that operates continuously, giving the communist regime the advantage of never having to rebuild institutional knowledge and relationships.

What the United States needs is a proactive plan that couples strength with excellence—militarily, economically, and morally. We need to lead by example, setting a narrative and industrial activities that others want to follow. America’s most enduring power has always been its ability to inspire allies, partners, and even former adversaries. Attraction works best when it is underwritten by confidence and credibility.

This discussion takes on even greater urgency in light of the upcoming National Defense Strategy, which is expected to emphasize homeland defense. Protecting the homeland, which is no longer limited to physical borders or interests, is the first responsibility of government, as it should be. At the same time, we must prioritize deterring China in the Indo-Pacific theater and the threat that China presents. As China’s military strategist and author of the “Art of War,” Sun Tzu famously stated, “supreme excellence consists in breaking the enemy’s resistance without fighting.” Achieving that kind of excellence requires global engagement, forward presence, and a posture that reassures allies and partners even as it deters adversaries.

At this critical moment, the United States cannot afford to pull back from the Indo-Pacific or cede initiative to China while Xi consolidates regional dominance. Nor can we risk appearing distracted or hesitant. Our competitors are watching closely for signs of vacillation, and they will seize every opportunity to fill any vacuum we leave behind.

The challenge then is to strike the right balance: strengthening homeland defense while doubling down on our ability to project power abroad, deter aggression, and shape the international environment in ways that favor peace. This means investing in next-generation technologies, replenishing our munitions stockpiles, modernizing our logistics and industrial base, and ensuring that our warfighters remain the best-trained, best-equipped force on earth. It also means aligning our diplomacy, economic policy, and information strategy with this effort—so that when we say we will defend the rules-based order, it is not a slogan but a credible commitment.

The United States has a narrow window to get this right. Congressional resources, executive follow-through, and sustained global engagement are necessary to restore readiness and ensure the United States does not cede influence to China and its partners. Otherwise, we could foster false confidence at home while calling into question U.S. credibility at a critical moment in the strategic competition.

Ultimately, reclaiming the spirit of the Department of War and taking the initiative across the economic and information domains, matched by investments, alliances, and a narrative the world wants to follow, can avoid conflict, and importantly preserve a world where peace endures.

From RealClearWire

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.