The Philippines: The Mental Part of National Defense

Commentary

The Balikatan military exercise, held between April 20 and May 8 in the Philippines, was a good one. Troops from the Philippines, United States, Japan, Australia, New Zealand, Canada, and France got real combat training—and a lot of it.

It was also being conducted with China in mind—even if nobody will say so. That’s the etiquette.

Even better, the forces are training in the area that would be part of the “operational area” in the event that China’s People’s Liberation Army moves against Taiwan.

This includes the northern Philippines, facing the South China Sea and the Luzon Strait (the Bashi Channel) between Taiwan and the Philippines. The People’s Liberation Army will need to move through this channel to protect its right flank or to conduct operations on the east side of Taiwan.

It’s always best to train where you’ll fight.

And militaries improve just the way that sports teams do.

Training with partners is even more helpful—so you’re not strangers when the time comes to fight for real.

But beyond the operational benefits of Balikatan-type exercises, there’s a psychological and political benefit that is sometimes overlooked.

When militaries exercise together, they tend to view each other differently.

Not least as more equal partners.

Along with providing enhanced confidence in each partner’s capabilities, joint military exercises tend to strengthen political alliances.

Overly imbalanced defense relationships are risky. One side eventually feels put upon and restrained. The other comes to think that it’s doing too much for an ungrateful partner.

This weakens a relationship and, unchecked, can destroy it.

The Japan Self-Defense Forces (JSDF) sent a large contingent to join this year’s Balikatan combat exercises for the first time, and is otherwise rapidly improving its capabilities.

It’s a good reminder of how improved operational capabilities bring along psychological and political advantages.

Not long ago, the Japan–U.S. defense relationship was dangerously imbalanced, with Japan pathologically dependent on the U.S. military for protection.

When Japan’s amphibious force got its start in late 2011 with a small group of U.S. and Japanese officers quietly pushing things forward, the idea was partly to give Japan a necessary capability.

An island nation with vast maritime territory must be able to conduct amphibious operations along the littorals.

These are necessary for both disaster relief and for fighting an enemy invader.

And the effort was also a way to address a fundamental JSDF weakness: the unwillingness and inability of the three JSDF services to operate together. Amphibious capability was a forcing function to get ground and naval forces to cooperate—and eventually work in the Japan Air Self-Defense Force.

But there was more intended than just filling a missing operational capability.

All this built confidence in JSDF, which sometimes seemed to have an inferiority complex toward the U.S. forces.

Even Japan’s political class had for years belittled the JSDF and its capabilities.

The American officers also wanted the U.S. military to take Japan seriously. Other than the U.S. Navy, the basic thinking in too many parts of the U.S. military was that the Americans would take care of things and the Japanese could go sit in the corner.

This was causing resentment within the JSDF and contributing to Japan’s political class’s lassitude, if not antagonism, toward defense.

Within a couple years, the JSDF became able to conduct complex, if rudimentary, amphibious operations, and its confidence increased. And the political class also saw Japan as able to play a more active role in the nation’s defense—and also in alliance operations.

Japan also became less gratingly deferential to the United States.

The U.S. side, in turn, saw Japan as a more useful and more equal, or at least less unequal, ally.

All in all, this strengthened the bilateral relationship. It made it harder for China to split the two politically, for example, by sending “white lobbyists” to Capitol Hill or by using Sunday talk shows to send a message that “Japan expects you Americans to do all the hard work and go die for them.” That would resonate widely.

And it would not be a vote-getter in Washington.

Conversely, and as importantly, consider the psychological effect of getting things right on one’s adversaries, such as the Chinese communist regime. A more militarily capable target nation is bad enough. Beijing hates it when its intended victims are better able to defend themselves, and it’s even more irked when intended victims get together to defend themselves. There’s a reason that Chinese leader Xi Jinping complains about “blocs.”

So from Balikatan and similar exercises, the free nations are enhancing their ability to resist Chinese aggression, but also, just as importantly, are coming to recognize that they can resist such aggression and need not submit to inevitable Chinese domination. Maybe next year, Taiwan can be invited.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.