Jiang Zemin Attempts to Shift Blame as the End of the Party Looms

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The Persecution of Falun Gong in China

According to a magazine article published in Hong Kong, China’s former paramount leader is having second thoughts about his time in power.

Those second thoughts are in an article in the Chinese-language Frontline magazine, where they are simultaneously hidden and in plain view. A message is being delivered—if one can sort the noise from the signal.

The article’s headline is “Admitting Human Beings Have Universal Values.” Its subhead is “The two major events Jiang Zemin regrets in his life.” The two events in question are the bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade and the persecution of Falun Gong.

The largest part of the article discusses the power struggle surrounding the Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) Eighteenth National Congress—the quadrennial meeting of Party members to take place in October, at which time the next set of Party leaders will be installed.

This part of the article portrays Jiang as someone who wields considerable political power behind the scenes. He is also said to take a flexible stance toward universal human values—democracy and freedom—and to be more likely than some other CCP leaders to adopt them.

But this discussion contradicts itself by pointing out that any change the Party makes will be in the direction of strengthening the Party’s rule. The adoption of democracy and human rights contradicts that basic premise. Jiang could not be serious about both political power and adopting democracy and human rights. The article’s discussion of Jiang’s supposed flexibility is not serious.

The reader is given a clear visual cue as to what is significant by the unusual layout of the article. The font used for the headline is 50 percent smaller than the font used for the subhead. The smaller part of the article, the discussion of Jiang’s two regrets, is what counts in the Frontline article.

A Question of Motive

With any leaked story, the question of credibility arises.

Frontline magazine has a track record of publishing confidential information about CCP officials. Many of these stories have later been confirmed.

For example, in July 2007, the magazine published an article about the Liu Zhijun brothers’ corruption. Liu was the minister of Railways. On Feb. 12, the CCP Central Discipline Committee started to investigate him, and he was removed from his position on Feb. 25. Most of the corruption exposed by Frontline more than three years ago was eventually confirmed by the CCP itself.

According to the article, Jiang, in his retirement, has wanted to publish an autobiography. However, for a long list of reasons, the Party won’t allow any former Party or state leaders to publish their autobiographies. Li Peng, premier at the time of the 1989 Tiananmen Square massacre, wanted to publish his autobiography to defend his role in 1989 and still couldn’t get it approved.

Jiang is said to have tried to circumvent the ban on autobiographies by writing articles under the names of his children—in the CCP leadership circles, children writing about their parents is common. He also began in 2010 dictating his experiences to trusted, close assistants, according to the article.

The article about Jiang didn’t release the source of the information about Jiang’s regrets. Assuming the report about the regrets is accurate, there are only two possibilities. Either the assistants who heard the stories from Jiang told the reporter, or Jiang himself leaked the story.

The key question is whether Jiang had a reason for arranging for this story of his regrets to be told

Embassy Bombing

The bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade happened directly because of Jiang’s decision. In the spring of 1999, NATO air raids had destroyed the Serbian military’s command and control system. Slobodan Milosevic sought help from Russia and China. Russia refused, but Jiang agreed to help without hesitation. Jiang also denied the Ministry of Foreign Affairs’ request to evacuate the embassy staff, even though all other countries had already done so.

Three Serbian intelligence units moved into the basement of the Chinese Embassy and started operations from there. When the NATO air strike hit the embassy, three embassy staff died. The Chinese media did not report 14 other deaths suffered by those in the basement.

The Chinese regime’s response was unusually weak because, according to the Frontline article, the United States showed the evidence that the Serbian military intelligence units were operating in the embassy. Jiang was then considered the most useless leader in China.

Continued on the next page: Persecution

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.