Chinese Regime Pushes for Loyalty After Major Military Shake-Up: Insiders

By Michael Zhuang
Michael Zhuang
Michael Zhuang
Michael Zhuang is a contributor to The Epoch Times with a focus on China-related topics.
January 27, 2026Updated: January 30, 2026

Following the recent removal of two of China’s most senior military officials, the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) appears to be accelerating a broader effort to reshape the top command of the People’s Liberation Army (PLA)—one that goes beyond corruption and focuses on political loyalty and control of the armed forces.

The Epoch Times spoke to several sources in China, who requested anonymity for safety reasons, after the purge of Central Military Commission Vice Chairman Zhang Youxia and Central Military Commission member Liu Zhenli, who also heads the Joint Staff Department.

Sources close to senior CCP officials told The Epoch Times that the two men have been secretly detained and placed in complete isolation at a heavily guarded site in Beijing’s Changping district.

Multiple sources said the preliminary political assessment of the two men isn’t centered on routine disciplinary or legal violations but on allegations that they sought to “split the Central Military Commission”—a charge that directly challenges the Central Military Commission chairman and the military’s ultimate command authority.

In the context of the CCP, such an accusation places a case at the highest possible political level.

The current Central Military Commission chairman is Chinese leader Xi Jinping.

Purge Signals

Within the CCP, accusations such as “splitting the Party” or “splitting the central leadership” are extremely rare and reserved for figures deemed to pose a substantive threat to the core power structure. These labels are typically not spelled out in public documents, but they carry decisive weight internally. The true political meaning often becomes clear only from how the regime subsequently handles the case.

The CCP’s post-1989 treatment of former General Secretary Zhao Ziyang was a historical precedent for this kind of opaque but consequential political judgment. Zhao was viewed as a pro-reform leader within the CCP before the Tiananmen Square Massacre in 1989, but he was removed from power and placed under house arrest that same year until his death in 2005.

Epoch Times Photo
Chinese Communist Party General Secretary Zhao Ziyang (C) addresses the student hunger strikers through a megaphone at dawn on May 19, 1989, in one of the buses at Tiananmen Square in Beijing. (Xinhua/AFP via Getty Images)

Military on High Alert

A Chinese military insider familiar with the situation told The Epoch Times that the handling of Zhang and Liu has sent shockwaves throughout the PLA.

Mid- and senior-level officers across multiple units have been ordered to cancel leave, halt planned travel, and remain on standby, according to the insider. At the same time, the military’s command and propaganda systems have been tightened, creating an atmosphere of heightened tension.

According to the PLA insider, internal documents are being circulated across all theater commands and service branches, conveying what is described as the “spirit of the Central Military Commission.”

The substance of these instructions closely mirrors a Jan. 24 editorial published by PLA Daily. The editorial demanded that all officers and soldiers “maintain a high degree of consistency with the Central Military Commission” in both political stance and action, leaving no room for deviation.

Some insiders from within the military told The Epoch Times that this approach—using an authoritative editorial to set the political tone at the earliest stage of a case—is uncommon even by the standards of recent PLA purges.

One analyst close to the military told The Epoch Times that the overtly political tone suggests a political narrative was first reached at the very top, with investigations and disciplinary procedures following as a mere show trial rather than open-ended inquiries.

Focus on Power, Not Money

From the official narrative and its accompanying propaganda, analysts say Zhang’s case appears less focused on financial corruption than on a reordering of military power itself.

The early intervention by the PLA’s official newspaper, the highly politicized language of internal notices, and the rapid dissemination of documents form what one observer described as a classic “conclusion first, disposal later” process. This is designed to quickly draw political boundaries and suppress internal debate.

A retired CCP official told The Epoch Times that Zhang’s vulnerability lies in his unique influence within the military. As a veteran of the 1979 Sino-Vietnamese War, Zhang has spent decades building personal networks rooted in shared experience and seniority rather than purely institutional authority. That kind of “credential-based power” has persisted even after Xi consolidated control over the armed forces.

Long-Running Rift With Xi

In October 2025, The Epoch Times cited multiple military insiders as saying Zhang had clashed sharply with Xi over whether China should use force against Taiwan.

According to those accounts, Zhang repeatedly opposed launching an immediate military campaign, arguing that this would risk intervention from the United States and its allies.

Sources said Zhang favored stabilizing the situation and avoiding a major conflict amid economic slowdown and diplomatic isolation. Xi interpreted this stance as “undermining military morale,” making it a trigger for subsequent purges of senior officers.

One source with long-standing ties to the military told The Epoch Times that Xi used anti-corruption investigations—particularly targeting the Rocket Force and equipment procurement systems—to curb Zhang’s influence. That campaign led to the sweeping removal of senior officers from the Rocket Force.

Under pressure, Zhang allegedly countered by reshuffling personnel and pushing for investigations into figures aligned with Xi’s camp, including political work chief Miao Hua and former vice chairman He Weidong.

“It became a life-and-death struggle within the military,” the source said.

Zhang ultimately managed to retain his post and factional base—until now.

Epoch Times Photo
Vice Chairman of the Central Military Commission of the People’s Republic of China Zhang Youxia leaves after delivering his speech during the opening ceremony of the 19th Western Pacific Naval Symposium in Qingdao, Shandong Province, China, on April 22, 2024. (Wang Zhao/AFP via Getty Images)

Timing and Symbolism

Pan, a China-based analyst who follows PLA politics closely and is only identified by his surname for safety reasons, told The Epoch Times that the decision to move against Zhang as China approaches the PLA’s 100th anniversary sends a strong signal that the leadership is seeking to eliminate uncertainty at a critical juncture.

“The core objective isn’t anti-corruption,” Pan said. “It’s to force a clear alignment within the military over who ultimately controls command authority.”

Military insiders in Beijing and the Eastern Theater Command told The Epoch Times that the handling of Zhang, Liu, and other heavyweight figures is not an isolated incident but part of a coordinated political operation tied to a specific timetable.

The Jan. 24 PLA Daily editorial offers clues to the scale of the purge. Pan noted that the headline’s framing of anti-corruption as a “tough battle,” a “protracted battle,” and an “overall battle” is not rhetorical excess but a deliberate classification.

The “tough battle,” he said, reflects the seniority of the targets since Zhang and Liu sit at the very core of the military power structure. The “protracted battle” signals that the campaign is not a short-term cleanup but a systematic effort to dismantle entrenched networks and factions within the military. Most striking is the term “overall battle,” he said.

“That wording means anti-corruption has been elevated into a comprehensive struggle involving political loyalty and command systems,” Pan said. “That’s why the editorial repeatedly invokes terms like ‘political military-building,’ ‘absolute leadership,’ and ‘the foundation of ruling power.’”

Chen, another insider, told The Epoch Times on condition of revealing only his surname, that the PLA’s long-standing opacity has made it one of the most corruption-prone sectors of the CCP system.

He grew up in military compounds as part of the “red second generation”—the sons and daughters born in the 1960s and ’70s to Chinese political elites, who were weaned on the politics and ideology of Mao Zedong.

Chen said civilian law enforcement has no jurisdiction over the military, creating structural impunity.

He said large-scale smuggling by military units began as early as the late 1970s, with military vehicles effectively off-limits to local law enforcement. Corruption in weapons procurement has persisted for decades, he said.

“Before Zhang was promoted, the military disciplinary bodies already had evidence of his corruption,” Chen said.

Xu Jia contributed to this report.