Taiwan’s Leadership Transitions: Prime Time for Coercion and Clarity

Commentary

Taiwan’s main opposition party, the Kuomintang (KMT), elected Cheng Li-wun as chair on Nov. 1, succeeding Eric Chu and making her the second woman to hold the post. Her win arrives as the KMT is the largest party in the Legislative Yuan—without a majority—and as a KMT speaker presides over a hung parliament. That combination gives China’s ruling Communist Party a political weapon for influence: legislative leverage during a leadership handover.

Cheng has cast herself as a reformer who prizes cross-Strait “peace” through dialogue with Beijing and has signaled opposition to further increases in defense spending. These positions resonate with parts of the KMT base and in Beijing’s propaganda feeds but will likely strain ties with Washington. Her calibration forward is critical, and early signals matter because they become fodder for narratives that Beijing amplifies when it wants to portray deterrence as “provocation.”

Doctrine: Deception Is the Operating System

This is not guesswork. The Chinese People’s Liberation Army (PLA) doctrine elevates deception and surprise, from supporting acts to the main event—rooted in classical theory but updated for the gray zone. The Yijiangshan Island assault of 1955 remains a canonical case study for masking intent and collapsing a defender’s decision window. Today, that lineage lives on in “non-war military activities”: law-enforcement façades, administrative “warnings,” and media/legal gambits that let force posture hide in plain sight.

One thing keeps recurring: civilian shipping. Naval War College studies document the PLA’s use of dual-use roll-on/roll-off ferries, tested alongside floating causeways to offload armor at pace. Independent tracking and open-source analyses since 2021–2023 show multiple passenger/vehicle ferries modified and drilled for over-the-shore logistics—precisely the kind of mundane maritime traffic a scheduler would wave through until, suddenly, it isn’t mundane.

What to Expect in the Near Term

Expect choreography tightly timed to political milestones in Taipei.

The pattern was clear after the 2024 presidential inauguration: The Eastern Theater Command’s “Joint Sword-2024A” circled Taiwan while the China Coast Guard called parts of the action “law enforcement inspections.” That blend—warships plus badges—is the point. It creates ambiguity, drags domestic agencies into the frame, and blunts international responses.

Variants of that script are likely around Cheng’s swearing-in, key legislative sessions, and national-day observances.

Equally likely would be sharper “administrative” moves at sea. Beijing’s Coast Guard Regulation No. 3 and related rulemaking broaden pretexts for detentions, “temporary warning zones,” and boarding claims far outside accepted law—tools tailor-made to escalate under a veneer of legality. Expect selective enforcement around Kinmen/Matsu, detentions framed as fisheries or safety actions, and fast-moving narratives to paint Taipei’s responses as “illegal.”

In the air, the PLA has, at times, dialed back the most reckless intercepts after public exposure, but U.S. commands still document unsafe and unprofessional behavior near allied aircraft and ships. A transition window is the natural time to probe again, camera-ready, hoping Taipei or partners overreact or fail to react in ways that feed Beijing’s information campaign.

Narrative Manipulation Is the Main Effort

The PLA’s maneuvers are only half the campaign. The Chinese Communist Party’s (CCP’s) United Front activities—such as religious exchanges, influencer cultivation, student programs, and local-level “friendship” visits—build connective tissue for message amplification.

Recent research spotlights thousands of CCP-sponsored pilgrimages and cultural trips as channels for soft-pressure and political signaling, alongside a documented uptick in coordinated online disinformation targeting Taiwan’s democratic processes. Leadership transitions are the prime moments to push the “peace dividend” line and depict budget scrutiny as courage, not risk.

The Budget Is Part of Deterrence—and the Narrative About It

Taiwan’s defense minister has recently vowed to carry out President Lai Ching-te’s goal of steadily increasing defense spending to 5 percent of gross domestic product by 2030, citing persistent PLA pressure. That trajectory matters because it signals will, not just wallets.

When the legislature freezes or trims key lines, sometimes as a bargaining tactic, the action reverberates beyond Taiwan, raising doubts about resolve. The CCP amplifies those moments as “proof” that deterrence is destabilizing and unnecessary. The policy takeaway for every party in Taipei is simple: Argue over details, but protect the topline and timelines from theatrical cuts.

Make Deception Expensive: Practical Steps

Transparency blunts surprise. Taiwan and partners should publish a standing “civilian anomalies” dashboard—ferry bookings, unusual port congestion, municipal memoranda of understanding, telecom throttling—so journalists and markets can flag dual-use patterns in near real time. Naval War College and independent analysts have already given the blueprint for what to watch; publicizing it converts esoteric logistics into political cost when abused.

Second, create a clear image by fusing air and sea safety reporting. When U.S. and allied commands release cockpit video footage and legal assessments of unsafe or extralegal behavior, mirror those releases with Taiwanese civilian data so the picture is whole: not just jets but ferries, not just NOTAMs but port gate logs. Synthesis of activities has already nudged PLA aviators toward fewer reckless intercepts; sustaining it raises the price of negative behaviors during transition windows.

Third, make the networks visible so people can see how charm offensives and pressure tactics line up. United Front efforts work best when local figures—temple leaders, “friendship” groups, travel brokers—carry the message for free. If the public can see who’s connected to what, the spell breaks.

Have Taiwan’s Mainland Affairs Council, National Security Bureau, and civic groups keep mapping the ties: funding streams, organizers, itineraries. Publish the basics regularly and calmly, so people can see and decide for themselves.

For example, if a feel-good “peace” photo-op in Fujian lands the same week a Kinmen port gets slow-rolled, voters should be able to see that seam without anyone having to shout. Transparency lets them connect those dots on their own.

Finally, keep expectations honest with allies. RAND and AUSA studies are blunt: The PLA plans to use deception at scale, civilian lift will be integrated, and Taiwan’s resilience—civilian and military—will determine whether those ploys bite. That’s the frame for Washington and others: Support measures that make Taiwan harder to fool, not just harder to hit.

The Stakes

Leadership transitions reveal whether institutions can think clearly under pressure. The CCP will test that clarity with drills named after swords, ferries that look like ferries, and narratives that promise calm if Taipei just stands down. The answer is not bravado; it’s daylight, discipline, and steadiness—budget lines that hold, dashboards that speak, and a politics that refuses to outsource its judgment to someone else’s storyline. That is how a small island keeps a very large neighbor from writing its script.

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.