The Issue of Institutional Neutrality: A University Is Not a Political Party

By William Brooks
William Brooks
William Brooks
William Brooks is a Canadian writer who contributes to The Epoch Times from Halifax, Nova Scotia. He is a senior fellow with the Frontier Centre for Public Policy.
October 3, 2026Updated: October 4, 2026

Commentary

In the era of “woke” It’s refreshing to find genuine intellectual disagreement in the pages of a Canadian university publication. 

For this reason, Kate Jaimet, the editor responsible for the Prof v. Prof series in University Affairs, deserves congratulations. At a time when the academy seems more comfortable with consensus than controversy, deliberately giving academics an opportunity to argue opposing positions is a welcome development.

Two opposing essays in a summer edition of University Affairs addressed a particularly important question: Should universities take positions on controversial political and social issues, or should they remain institutionally neutral while providing a place for such questions to be vigorously debated?

The case against neutrality was made by Toronto Metropolitan University professor Jennifer Simpson. Mark Mercer of St. Mary’s University, Halifax wrote in opposition. Both arguments deserve serious consideration. Ultimately, however, professor Mercer’s position is more persuasive. Here’s why.

The Case Against Institutional Neutrality

Simpson’s argument begins with the proposition that universities do not exist in isolation from society. She asserts that students and professors live in a world confronted by war, racism, political violence, inequality, and human rights abuses. She is morally troubled by the expectation that universities should stand apart from such issues.

The Toronto Metropolitan University professor points to events she describes as: “the murder of George Floyd, the reports of unmarked graves at residential schools across Canada, and the wars in Gaza and Ukraine.”

She believes such events raise questions that are not merely academic. For her, they concern justice, human dignity, and the obligations of citizens and institutions. She argues that universities should be able to respond to such events rather than hide behind a doctrine of neutrality.

Simpson also contends that universities already make choices about what they value. They defend equality, oppose discrimination and harassment, and frequently express commitments to particular principles. If universities are already value-laden institutions, why should they claim neutrality when confronted by major social or political controversies?

In short, she argues that a university should not be an institution that refuses to engage with the world. Nor should institutional neutrality become an excuse to avoid controversial questions and refuse to take a side.

But here is where an important distinction must be made. There is a profound difference between a university encouraging the examination of controversial questions and the university itself taking a position on those questions.

This distinction lies at the heart of the opposing argument.

Why Neutrality Matters

Mercer’s starting point is that the university’s distinctive purpose is intellectual inquiry. Universities exist to investigate, question, test, challenge, and revise ideas. Their contribution to society is not primarily to pronounce upon every political controversy but to cultivate the habits of mind by which individuals can examine those controversies intelligently.

This is not to insist that universities must be morally neutral in some absolute sense. Institutions necessarily embody some values. Universities value reason, evidence, freedom of inquiry and intellectual independence.

But the very idea of a university presupposes that claims should be open to examination rather than accepted simply because they have been endorsed by some powerful authority.

The danger arises when the institution itself begins to take sides on contested questions. Once a university announces an official position on a political or social issue, disagreement can become extremely difficult to manage. A professor or student who challenges that position is no longer simply disagreeing with another participant in an intellectual debate. They can appear to be challenging the institution itself.

This matters because institutional authority is different from individual opinion.

A professor can argue passionately that one side in a political controversy is correct. Another professor can argue the opposite. Students can listen to both and make up their own minds. That is precisely what academic freedom is supposed to allow.

But when the university itself declares a position correct, the relationship changes. The institution that is supposed to provide the arena for debate has entered the debate as a participant.

Mercer makes a vital point: Institutional neutrality is not an assertion that contentious questions are out of bounds. It is an attempt to preserve the conditions under which disputed positions can be debated.

Neutrality Is Not Indifference

The argument for neutrality can be misunderstood. Defending institutional neutrality is not the same as saying that universities should ignore controversial public issues.

On the contrary, public issues belong in universities. They should be investigated by historians, philosophers, political scientists, economists, sociologists, and scholars in many other disciplines. Students should be encouraged to ask difficult questions about them. Professors should be free to reach strongly held conclusions. University departments should be able to organize lectures and conferences at which controversial propositions are defended and attacked.

Consider the distinction between a university discussing the Israeli–Palestinian conflict and a university declaring what its institutional position on that conflict must be. The first invites inquiry. The second establishes an official answer. The first creates space for disagreement. The second narrows it. This distinction is equally important on questions of race, Indigenous history, capitalism, climate policy, immigration, gender, nationalism, or social justice.

Universities frequently justify institutional statements on the grounds that they reassure the members of marginalized communities. That intention may be entirely sincere. But there is a paradox here. The stronger the institutional consensus becomes on controversial political and social questions, the more difficult it becomes for members of the university community who disagree with that consensus to speak freely.

Engagement Over Partisanship

The question is not whether difficult subjects should be discussed. They emphatically should be. The question is whether the university should participate in the argument or provide a forum for it.

If the university officially embraces a particular interpretation of racism, colonialism, international affairs, or social justice, someone who questions that interpretation will find themself not merely disagreeing with colleagues but opposing the values of the university itself. This is precisely why institutional neutrality serves academic freedom. It protects the dissenter.

A professor or student who holds an unpopular view should not have to persuade the university administration before being entitled to express it. Nor should the intellectual legitimacy of an argument depend upon whether it conforms to a fashionable consensus.

Academic institutions must encourage intellectual engagement without becoming officially partisan. The university should support an open and genuinely inclusive public square. It is not a political party.

In fact, a university’s protection of neutral space for civil discourse is an indispensable service to the citizens of a free society. 

Views expressed in this article are the opinions of the author and do not necessarily reflect the views of The Epoch Times.